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Keynote Address
Jeffrey Lang*
I want to begin by trying to figure out what we are talking about when we
discuss international investment agreements. Let's look at a very simple,
hypothetical fact situation.
Assume that a company in New York discovers that the product it
makes has a market in Europe. After some research, it decides the
economics of exporting to a single customer make sense. The -company
negotiates various details in a series of transatlantic telephone calls and
travel, and shipments begin. At this point, no significant foreign direct
investment has occurred.
Later, the New York company discovers that more than one customer
is interested in its product, which poses several problems. The company
cannot find out exactly what the customers need without a representative
in Europe (someday soon, the Internet will probably eliminate this stage).
Consequently, someone must be hired and furnished with an office.
Boom: A little outward direct investment.
Further down the road, the company has so many customers with
demands such that the company needs a warehouse. Boom: Another
direct investment.
Even further down the road, the company realizes it can assemble the
last stage of the product in Europe, so it rents some land and puts up a
final assembly facility, employing twenty workers. More outward
investment.
If you extrapolate this fact situation to the largest single economy in
the world, you find a tangle of economic activity in which trade in goods,
trade in services, and outward and inward direct and portfolio investment
(and probably a few other complications) are all wrapped up in enormous
economic activity. It is that activity that we are talking about.
The first question we have to ask is, "Is this good?"
Of course, whether it is good is more or less a moot question because
so much of this is happening now that it would be almost impossible to
unwind it without crippling the economy. But humor me a little.
It is certainly good for the single company in New York that is making
money by increasing sales. But what about the community the company is
located in? Is it losing tax revenue because storage or some stage of
manufacturing facilities are no longer needed in that community? Is it
losing jobs because people who used to work in those facilities are no
longer employed in such facilities? Or is it gaining jobs? In 1995, non* Deputy United States Trade Representative; Co-leader of U.S. Delegation to
OECD Negotiation of a Multilateral Agreement on Investment.
31 CORNELL IN 'LLJ. 455 (1998)
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bank, foreign-owned facilities in the United States employed five percent of
our people! Who are they? Are we losing more than we are gaining? Can
we measure any of this?
There is some gross data. We know that the United States imports a
lot of capital. We are the biggest magnet for foreign capital in the world. In
fact, last year, we attracted sixty percent more capital than China, the
second-largest importer of capital in the world.' We imported $60 billion
in 19962 and $84.6 billion in 1997. As my hypothetical fact situation
suggests, this is probably partly related to the fact that the United States is
the largest importing country in the world. However, if you review all the
data, you see that is not the only reason.
Why did we import so much capital? Capital, after all, is just money.
And money - allowing for changes in exchange rates - is a fungible

commodity. This money had a choice: if it was to be "invested," it could
have been invested here or somewhere else. As almost any governor in the
United States could tell us, our objective is, or ought to be, to attract
investment because it will bring jobs. We might do that with tax holidays
and shaving corners on environmental requirements, but seventy billion
dollars? That is a big tax holiday.
No, as far as we can tell, the main reason that foreign investment is
sent to the United States is that the relationship between risk and reward is
very good. There is very little risk that the United States will treat a foreign
investment differently from domestic investments. Also, the strength of the
U.S. economy assures a reasonably good return.
What about the other side of the transaction, the part about exporting
capital? I think we have to admit that the jobs of specific workers have, in
some sense, been moved abroad. Sometimes such workers get a new job in
the same company that sent their job abroad because the company is doing
so much better in exporting that it has the jobs to give. Often enough,
however, such workers cannot get jobs even in their home community.
They have to learn a new skill and relocate. That is why President Clinton
has emphasized lifetime learning so much.
More importantly, however, when we export and import capital
vigorously, our economy as a whole gains through more exports and more
jobs. Therefore, as a policy matter, we believe that being open to foreign
investment is a good policy, especially if other countries are open to our
investments. Moreover, the more security we give foreigners in their
investments here, the more likely we are to attract the investment. By the
same token, if we can get that security from others, all things being equal,
our exports to these countries ought to increase.
Our policy ought to be to convince other countries to provide as much
security for investments as we do. Indeed, that is our policy.
1. U.N. CONFERENCE

ON TRADE AND DEV.

(UNCTAD),

WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT

1997, at XIX, U.N. Doc. TD/JUNCTAD/ITE/IIT/5, U.N. Sales No. 97.1I.D.10 (1997).
2. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
INTERNATIONAL DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS YEARBOOK

1997, at 12 (1997).
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The United States has negotiated over forty bilateral investment
treaties, or BITs, with countries around the world. These treaties give us an
assurance, through dispute resolution procedures, that certain basic rights
and privileges will be accorded to our outward investors in these countries,
and, of course, we accord the same privileges on a reciprocal basis. The
BIT Program supports the key U.S. government economic policy objectives
of promoting U.S. exports and enhancing the international competitiveness
of U.S. companies.
The BIT program's basic aims are to: 1) protect U.S. investment
abroad in those countries where U.S. investors' rights are not protected
through existing agreements; .2) encourage adoption in foreign countries of
market-oriented domestic policies that treat private investment fairly; and
3) support the development of international law standards consistent with
these objectives.
There are six basic guarantees found in U.S. BITs. First, our BITs
ensure that host governments treat U.S. companies as favorably as their
competitors. U.S. investors receive the better of national or most favored
nation (MFN) treatment both when they seek to initiate investment and
throughout the life of the investment, subject to certain limited and
specifically described exceptions listed in annexes or protocols to the
treaties.
Second, BITs establish clear limits on the expropriation of investments
and ensure that U.S. investors will be fairly compensated. Expropriation
can occur only in accordance with international law standards, that is, for
a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner, under due process of
law, and accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate, and effective
compensation.
Third, BITs guarantee that U.S. investors have the right to transfer
funds into and out of the country without delay using a market rate of
exchange. This guarantee covers all transfers related to an investment,
including interest, proceeds from liquidation, repatriated profits, and
infusions of additional financial resources after the initial investment has
been made. Ensuring the right to transfer funds creates a predictable
environment guided by market forces.
Fourth, BITs limit the ability of host governments to require U.S.
investors to adopt inefficient and trade distorting practices. In particular,
BITs limit performance requirements, such as local content or export
quotas. This provision may also open up new markets for U.S. producers
and increase U.S. exports. U.S. investors protected by BITs can purchase
competitive U.S.-produced components without restriction on inputs in
their production of various products. They also can import other U.S.produced products for distribution and sale in the local market. They
cannot be forced, as a condition of establishment or operation, to export
locally produced goods back to the U.S. market or to third-country
markets.
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Fifth, BITs give U.S. investors the right to submit an investment dispute
with the treaty partner's government to international arbitration. There is
no requirement to use the host country's domestic courts.
Sixth, BITs give U.S. investors the right to engage the top managerial
personnel (i.e., not unskilled workers) of their choice, regardless of
nationality.
Since these agreements are treaties, they require Senate approval
through the treaty-making power. Once approved, the treaties become the
policy of this country. Thirty-one of forty-two treaties signed have entered
into force. The remaining agreements are pending ratification.
In addition, Congress has approved or encouraged multilateral trade
agreements in services. While investment is plainly necessary to exporting
a good, as demonstrated above, we do not generally include investment
provisions in goods agreements, such as tariff agreements.
However, we cannot even begin to have an effective services trade
agreement without investment commitments. As a practical matter, it is
almost impossible (at least it was before the Internet) to deliver a service
without a commercial presence in the target market. Moreover, most
services markets are even more regulated than goods markets.
The United States is the largest exporter in the world. Therefore it
should not be surprising that we are also the largest capital exporter in the
world. We have a trade surplus in services, so, again, it should not be
surprising that Congress would generally approve of our trying to assure
that security for U.S. investments related to services.
In the case of the services trade agreement, the enforcement
mechanism is quite powerful indeed: it is the so-called single undertaking
of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Therefore, if countries fail to
abide by their investment commitments in services, we are, in effect, preauthorized to retaliate against that practice to the extent we are injured.
For example, the United States could, to some degree, refuse to accept
sneakers or computer chips from countries that deny us the investment
assurances we have achieved in services.
The nature of WTO assurances on investment issues is sweeping.
Those most prominently mentioned in the press are simply the ability to
own a percentage of a foreign enterprise or to open branches of U.S. firms.
Of course, some of these obligations are phased in over time, and others
are less ambitious than we would like. For example, in the financial
services agreement achieved last December, a number of countries have
agreed to allow foreigners to own only fifty-one percent or, in some cases,
only forty-nine percent of financial services providers. 3 While these
agreements generated industry support, they are less ambitious than the
United States desires, and therefore we are continuing to urge our trading
partners to improve them.
In addition to these commitments, however, services trade agreements
are generally subject to the General Agreement on Trade in Services, or
3. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44.
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GATS, which provides for national treatment and other basic rights of
services.
Both BITs and GATS have general exceptions and specific exceptions.
Exceptions are reservations or carve-outs from the obligations of the
agreements. General objections are those written into the normative text of
the agreements, which generally relate to subjects such as national security
and public health. This means that a country may act inconsistent with
some or all of it's obligations if the reasons for that action fall under the
exception.
Specific exceptions are taken by a country when it is not ready as a
domestic political matter or domestic policy to allow the obligation to
apply. Specific exceptions should be, in our view, as narrow as possible.
They should be country specific and should be no broader than necessary
to service the political or policy interest concerned. The reason is simple:
In the future, we expect more services negotiations, and we hope then to
remove these specific exceptions in the give and take of market access
negotiations.
Let me give you two U.S. examples of specific exceptions.
In telecommunications services, we have an MFN exception for directto-home (DTH) and direct broadcast satellite (DBS) broadcasting, and we
have an exception from our general policy of allowing 100% foreign
ownership of telecommunications facilities, to require that these interests
be held indirectly. The first is a political requirement, and the second is a
policy requirement.
The DTH/DBS exception is completely transparent. At the end of
telecommunications negotiations, we were concerned that Canada refused
to give us access to their direct-to-home market on the same basis as we had
given to them. We therefore framed a targeted MFN exception that applies
to all countries to offset this lack of reciprocity. This is an exception to the
most-favored-nation obligation of GATS, which means we can discriminate
against Canada, for example, in licensing decisions.
The indirect ownership requirement reflects the provisions of U.S. law
that require certain U.S. telecommunications radio licenses to be held by
companies that are owned no more than twenty percent by foreigners.
However, the requirement permits 100% foreign ownership of those
companies. This provision of U.S. law serves jurisdictional and other legal
purposes. The exception applies only to the United States, and is no
broader than absolutely necessary under current U.S. law. As a practical
matter, it does not affect market access in the United States, even though as
a technical matter it does discriminate against foreigners.
We have also addressed investment issues in the North American Free
Trade Agreement, or NAFTA. The six basic principles identified for the
BITs are exactly the same basic principles of the investment provisions of
4
the NAFTA:
4. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mex.-Can., 32 I.L.M.

296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994).
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1) U.S. investors receive the better of national or most-favored-nation
(MFN) treatment both when they seek to initiate investment and
throughout the life of that investment, subject to certain limited and
specifically described exceptions listed in annexes or protocols to the
treaties.
2) NAFTA establishes international law standards for the
expropriation of investments and ensures that U.S. investors will be fairly
compensated.
3) Investors have the right to transfer funds into and out of the country
without delay using a market rate of exchange. This covers all transfers
related to an investment, including interest, proceeds from liquidation,
repatriated profits and infusions of additional financial resources after the
initial investment has been made.
4) Disciplines on the use of trade and investment distorting
performance requirements, such as local content or export quotas, are
prohibited.
5) In addition to state-to-state arbitration, U.S. investors have the right
to submit an investment dispute with the treaty partner's government to
international arbitration.
6) U.S. investors have the right to engage the top managerial personnel
(i.e., not unskilled workers) of their choice, regardless of nationality.
Most of the U.S. exceptions to the NAFTA are tied to specific laws and
thus are as narrow as possible. For example, the United States took
reservations for the Mineral Lands Leasing Act; the Atomic Energy Act of
1954; and the insurance and loan guarantees for the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC). In the NAFTA, the United States also took
some broader exceptions to cover matters where we were unwilling to bind
ourselves, primarily because there were insufficient commitments from
NAFTA partners - similar to why we took the exception for DTH/DBS in
the GATS.
We have actually been addressing investment issues for some years
now, with the full advice, approval and consent of the Congress and our
business community. The reasons are, basically, that these agreements
help our exports and our employment overall.
Some years ago, the Congress directed us at the Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) in our role as the U.S. representative at
multilateral trade negotiations to consider the general issue of investment
issues. In the process of this review, the Administration noticed an
interesting fact: most international investment, contrary to popular belief,
is between industrialized, mature economies, not between developed and
developing countries. Nearly three-quarters of global investment stock
(70.9%, to be specific) 5 is in industrialized countries. New investment

primarily continues to go to industrial countries, at an average growth rate
of ten percent over the last fourteen years. 6 Even the increase in U.S.
5. UNCTAD, supra note 1, at XIX-XX.
6. Id.
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foreign direct investment, which grew eleven percent between 1995 and
1996, was concentrated in industrialized, high wage countries rather than
in developing, low wage countries. Nearly two-thirds of the increase
occurred in Western Europe, Canada, Japan, and Australia. Moreover,
within Europe, four countries alone - France, Germany, the UK, and the
Netherlands - account for eighty-three percent of U.S. Foreign Direct
Investment in Europe, eighty-three percent of our exports to the EU, and
eighty-five percent of our imports from the EU. 7
Industrialized countries are members of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the successor to the
Marshall Plan, which now includes several non-European countries that are
fully industrialized or on their way to being industrialized, such as Japan,
Australia, Korea, and Mexico.
Rather than try to bring investment into the WTO directly, where it
would have to be accepted by 130 countries, including many developing
and least-developed countries, we decided to try to reach an agreement
within the OECD that generalized the ambitious provisions we had
achieved in services trade agreements and NAFTA. Such provisions
include narrow general exceptions, extremely narrow country-specific
exceptions, and strong general provisions on national treatment, MFN
treatment, and dispute settlement.
Now, let's examine some of the proposals on the table in an active
negotiation - the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI). In light of
the facts about the relationship between investment and trade, I would like
to point out some of the reasons why the United States has difficulty
accepting some proposals made by other governments in this negotiation.
The United States is concerned that the sound investment policy
principles we aim for in an MAI would be undercut by proposals for
ambiguous and non-transparent carve-outs or exceptions from the MAI's
basic obligations. Certain countries support several broad exceptions of
general application to the obligations without clearly specifying what
measures would be covered. Such provisions are the public order
exception, the exception for cultural issues, and the provision for Regional
Economic Integration Organizations (the REIO clause).
We intend for the MAI agreement to provide a broad multilateral
framework for international investment, with high standards for the
liberalization of investment regimes, investment protection, and effective
dispute settlement.
Specific key elements should be the same as those in the BITs and the
NAFTA:
- the better of national or MFN treatment, including application to the
making of investments, with only limited exceptions;
- prohibition of performance requirements that distort trade or
investment;
7. Johanna L. Barranza, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.-EU Foreign Direct Investment,
DiRcT INVFSTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE 71, 84 (1997).
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- freedom to make any investment-related transfer, including profits,
capital, royalties, and fees;
- international
law standards for expropriation, including that
compensation must be prompt, adequate and effective, consistent with
U.S. law and practice;
- effective dispute settlement procedures for state-to-state and investor-tostate disputes.
The MAI we envision would: 1) lock-in current treatment to the
greatest extent possible; 2) improve the investment climate among current
OECD members and future MAI signatories; 3) broaden acceptance of
international investment norms; and 4) provide clear, predictable, and
transparent treatment of U.S. investors.
A key element for the success of the negotiations is the issue of
exceptions to the agreement. We are negotiating strong economy-wide
provisions on non-discrimination (national treatment and MFN) and the
protection of investment. The MAI is a top-down agreement; therefore,
obligations would apply in all cases unless specific exceptions are
scheduled. This means that unless a country takes an exception, it is
bound to the MAI obligations. If a country fails to meet those obligations,
it can be taken to binding dispute settlement and subjected to
compensation and retaliation.
Negotiating specific exceptions to the basic obligations, which is
crucial to determining the quality of commitments, is a complex task. We
all support the goals of clarity, certainty, and predictability for investors.
However, these goals will be compromised unless exceptions are handled
properly. We have yet to reach final agreement on either the process for
negotiating or the architecture of exceptions. The United States believes
these goals are best achieved through narrowly and precisely drawn
country specific exceptions rather than broad, ambiguous, and nontransparent carve-outs.
I would like to focus on one exception: the REIO clause. The proposal
by the European Community for an exception for a REIO raises a number
of concerns. The proposal strikes at the core of the non-discrimination
principle that is fundamental to the MAI. The exception would deny other
parties the benefits of liberalization that members of the EU provide
themselves and would allow member states to erect new barriers to U.S.
firms as they harmonize their policies to new Community standards. In
addition, it is not clear that U.S. firms already established in a member
state could rely on the protections of the Treaty of Rome (entitling them to
be treated as community companies) against such discrimination.
As I highlighted earlier, the ownership of foreign affiliates is a key
determinant of overall U.S.-EU bilateral trade performance, as trade
between related-parties (i.e., parent-subsidiaries) accounts for nearly one-
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half of the total.8 In addition, foreign direct investment leads to substantial
export surpluses in U.S.-EU trade, with both U.S. and EU parent firms
having large export surpluses in that trade with their foreign affiliates. If
the REIO clause denied U.S. companies investment opportunities in new
sectors or newly-liberalized sectors, U.S. exports to Europe could be
adversely affected. If the United States is to maintain its competitive
advantage, U.S. firms need to be able to react internationally to such
changes. Restrictions imposed on U.S. firms in our most important
investment partnership could be detrimental to our competitiveness.
The Europeans have suggested that U.S. investors would benefit from
the overall liberalization that would occur as a result of harmonization of
measures through the Community. If, for example, foreign equity
limitations in the United Kingdom were imposed in the future in a sector
where there are none today, the benefit from the "liberalization" would
occur in other member states. Other member states would raise the equity
limitations in the sector, possible creating new opportunities in those
countries. On average, we are told, there would be net liberalization. I am
not sure one can calculate this type of benefit with any precision because
many other factors determine where investment takes place.
Liberalization has changed the determinates of investment. Tariff and
non-tariff barriers have been lowered considerably and the cost differences
between locations, the quality of infrastructure, the ease of doing business,
and the availability of skills have become more important. It is unclear that
the member state economies are interchangeable in this regard. I believe it
would be nearly impossible to say that lost opportunities in the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Germany are readily and immediately
offset by new opportunities in Portugal, Spain, and Italy.
The proposed REIO clause would apply not only to present
Community members, but would allow, and might require, prospective
members 9 to erect new barriers long before they join. This is particularly
important given the need to have the ability to respond quickly to changes
in consumer demands or changing competitive situations. If EU
companies can invest in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, for
example, before U.S. firms, our exports to those markets could lag behind.
FDI flows to Central and Eastern Europe have soared to record levels.
Having remained stagnant in 1994, FDI inflows to these countries nearly
doubled in 1995, to reach an estimated $12 billion. 10 The region now
accounts for five percent of world inflows. 1 The EU continues to account
for most FDI flows into this region and accounts for nearly "three-quarters
of the FDI stock in Hungary and Bulgaria, two-thirds in the Czech
8. Lester Davis, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, U.S.-EU Goods and Services Trade Between
UnrelatedParties, in FOREIGN DiREcr INvESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UPDATE, supra
note 7, at 91, 98.
9. Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Romania, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
10. OECD, supra note 2, at 342.

11. Id.
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Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia," and a little over fifty percent in
12
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.
The FDI pattern in Central and Eastern Europe mirrors the pattern of
international trade in the region. The EU is the most important trading
partner for all of these countries, reflecting related party trade between EU
parents and their affiliates in the region.
There are many examples of FDI liberalization in Central and Eastern
Europe contributing to a healthier competitive market. Foreign direct
investment, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises, has helped
to de-monopolize markets and stimulate competitive behavior. Foreigninvestor participation in the restructuring and privatization of large stateowned enterprises has helped to overcome the legacy of monopolization.
Foreign affiliates typically have better marketing capabilities, a
superior market performance, and also engage more actively in exporting
than do purely domestic firms. "Competition introduced by such firms,
either in the form of products and services unavailable previously or of
higher quality, is forcing local producers and service providers to enhance
13
their own performance."
The United States will not accept being disadvantaged both in terms of
investment and trade even before countries join the EU. We need to study
carefully the risks associated with the REIO proposal. Permitting broad,
discriminatory practices puts the competitiveness of U.S. companies and
the competitive advantage of the United States at risk. These concerns
only increase when the scope of the provision is examined in light of other
RETOs, such as Mecosur.
Even though the OECD is generally thought of as a "European"
organization, the correct completion of the MAI has implications beyond
the United States and Europe. First, OECD membership is expanding; its
most recent members are South Korea, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and
Poland. Second, MAI membership will not be limited to OECD member
countries. Hong Kong, Argentina, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have all
expressed interest in joining the agreement.
Finally, the MAI will set a precedent for others to follow - either by
joining the agreement or using the MAI as the model for a regional or
bilateral agreement. It is important to ensure that any agreement on
international regulation of foreign direct investment meets the objectives I
have laid out today since there are far reaching consequences. We need to
negotiate a good agreement in the MAI for these reasons, particularly in
light of the recent events in Asia.
As I will point out, the reforms called for by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) to address the structural problems in Asia are
complemented by the basic objectives of an MAI: non-discriminatory
12. UNCTAD, WORLD INvEsrsmENr REPORT 1996, at 65, U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.A.14

(1996).
13. UNCTAD, supra note 1, at 100.
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treatment of foreign investors and investment liberalization fostering
competition along with clear, transparent, and predictable rules.
The economic difficulties faced by several economies in Asia are far
reaching. The IMF, however, moved quickly to stabilize the economies and
create the conditions for stabilized currencies in the affected Asian
countries. Beyond these immediate goals, structural reform must be
implemented to build a longer-term foundation for economic stability in
the region. The stabilization programs that the IMF is financing in Asia
reflect this goal; the programs are more heavily focused on structural
reforms than on adjustment to macroeconomic policies. Such reforms
include measures to strengthen financial sectors, rationalize businessgovernment linkages, improve transparency, open inarkets to foreign
investment, and reduce trade barriers.
The IMF concluded that microeconomic barriers to competition
helped worsen the financial problems. Structural reform leading to
systemic change, including greater competition engendered by market
opening measures, transparency, and economic deregulation, all intersect
with the broader goals of market stabilization. It is not surprising that
many of the structural reform components of the IMF packages will
contribute directly to improvements in the trade and investment regimes of
these countries.
The fundamentals of these structural reforms are similar to the
fundamental policy objectives underlying the MAI.
In closing, I would like to stress a few important factors:
1) Firms can no longer rely on domestic markets to sustain their
competitive advantage. Improved access to foreign markets, as a result of
unilateral liberalization and the success of the WTO negotiations, enable
firms to choose more freely the modality, be it FDI, trade, licensing, or
subcontracting, that they prefer to serve markets overseas.
2) Improvements in information and communication technologies not
only have made it possible for firms to process and communicate vastly
more information at reduced costs, but to manage day-to-day, widely
dispersed production and service networks.
3) It seems clear that, first, trade eventually leads to FDI; and second,
that on balance, FDI leads to more trade.
4) For the United States to sustain and enhance its competitive
advantage as a nation, U.S. firms must take a global approach to strategy.
5) There is no comprehensive set of rules governing foreign investment
on par with the rules on trade as found in the World Trade Organization.
For these reasons international rules governing the regulation of
foreign direct investment are an important issue that governments should
and must tackle. We have found that one approach may not be the most
successful way to achieve our objectives, nor may a single initiative be
acceptable to all of our trading partners. The United States moves forward
on investment issues in several different fora with each effort
complementing and building upon the other. U.S. initiatives include:
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Continued bilateral negotiations: As investment issues come to the

forefront of the trade agenda, we are moving away from negotiations with
capital-scarce countries. We are now focussing on capital-exporting
countries, such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Bolivia, and Venezuela.
Fulfilling our longstanding commitment to Chile (since 1990) would
be our first step in building the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by
the year 2005. Investment will be a key element of that negotiation.
Regional Initiatives: As you know, we plan to complete to an FTAA by
the year 2005. The FTAA initiative has an active investment group
preparing for the launching of negotiations next year. In APEC, there is a
goal of free and open trade and investment by 2010-2020. There is also an
active Investment Experts Group examining investment issues.
Multilateral Efforts: In addition to the MAI, we are working in the
WTO on investment issues. At the Singapore Ministerial in 1996, it was
agreed to "establish a working group to study issues raised by Members
relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy, including
anti-competitive practices, in order to identify any areas that may merit
further consideration in the WTO framework."1 4 The group has two years
to complete its work and will report to Ministers in 1999. The work will
not prejudice a decision on whether negotiations will be initiated. The
initiation of any future negotiations would require an explicit consensus
among WTO members.
The United States will be active in negotiating agreements that
regulate foreign direct investment because, as I believe I have explained, it
is vitally important for our economic well-being to do so. This symposium
will discuss in more detail some of the specific policy issues and choices
facing countries today. I hope I have set the stage for a healthy debate.
Thank you.

14. WTO, Singapore MinisterialDeclaration,in WORLD
97 (1997).
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